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challenges immediately must be
faced in any attempt to study ethical
structures. There is little contemporary consensus as to what is the
basic starting point or subject matter of ethics.
The basic ethical approach used in this paper
will be strongly pragmatic in tone. This will allow
for the noting of a number of specific elements
in human and animal social structures which
interrelate and interact in a rich variety of possibilities. Ethical activity will be in evidence in the
habitually virtuous workings of practical attempts
to deal with and as best as possible solve the constantly perplexing problems present in the
dilemmas of everyday life and survival.
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lenge. There is a rather constant need to reinforce the social order of things. At times this can
be a touching and warm show of affection and
love. At other times attempts to disrupt the order
of things can lead to violence and even to
physical harm and in the most dire cases to
death. Social groupings of both canines and
humans display the Same traits. But these traits
also cross the lines of both groups, as evidenced
by our dogs regularly taking positions of submission to one or another (not everyone!) of us
and by our affectionate petting of them.
The second modality is evaluative. This is concerned with the functional significance of
behavior patterns. A few years ago I had the
opportunity to present a paper on ethical themes
in sociobiology to a meeting of the European
Sociobiology Association. The meeting took
place in a zoo at Arnhem, in the Netherlands,
because the zoo has one of the largest chimpanzee colonies under constant observation over
a period of a number of years. Very clearly noted
were a set of male dominance patterns.
Especially important were the leadership displays
of the chief males. They regularly made tours of
the colony displaying certain attitudes of stance
and deportment which demanded deference and
subjection from the other chimpanzees.
I live in a male religious community where this
kind of behavior is constantly in evidence. Certain
of the older members of the group have adapted a
style of rather rigid ~d aloof walking and talking
which demands deference and respect. Any challenge to this, just as in the case of the chimpanzees, is met with stern rebuke. This is quite
unconsciously done (a point I wish to return to
later), so that if one were to try to point out the
similarities to animal behavior, there would certainly be as much surprise as indignation. Yet
much ethics remains hidden here.
The correlational modality deals with the relationship between behavior patterns and environmental parameters. We generally tend to think
that animals are much more sensitive to their
environments than humans. Yet in actual fact we
both may much more share the same set of
problems than not. There are situations where
overconcentration of groupings of animals have
not only depleted natural resources in an area

Various approaches are currently suggested as
to how to undertake the study of structures. A
rather fierce debate rages around the anthropological techniques of Claude Levi-Strauss. At
times it seems that his methodology is so harsh
and rigid in its delineation of universal structures
of human behavior as to exclude the possibility
of a pragmatic problematic in human affairs. But
various clearly articulated strains in his work
point to a much more open-ended view of the
meldings and overlappings of the structures.
They can be seen as a network of patterned
activity in which parts and pieces within a single
structure are exchanged and transformed in ways
creative of highly ethical behavior. The workings
of these patternings will in some sense be
common to both human and animal behavior.
One of the most constructive and yet controversial ways of studying the patternings of both
human and animal behavior is the sociobiological methodology developed by Edward O.
Wilson. His analysis is constantly concerned with
ethical behavior. This will not be an ethic of
abstract, lofty principles but rather a rough and
ready ethic of involvement in the use of constantly threatened and fragmented social structures as tools in the practical solution of
problems of survival and development.
Wilson's associate and popularizer David P.
Barash maps out four modalities in sociobiological study. I The first is basically descriptive.
Here there is simply concern to identify the distinguishing characteristics of the behavior of different animal and human social groupings.
There is an effort made at simplicity in trying to
identify only the most salient and important elements. Important to note would be communal
behavior patterns distributed among various
groups. Let me use one of the easiest humananimal comparison groups to point out the
workings of this sociobiological modality.
Both humans and canines exhibit behavior
patterns which show a deep tendency and drive
to live in very close-knit family and extended
family units. There is in both species also a hierarchical structure within the group, with some
members of the group having a higher, more
powerful and more important status than others.
This creates both strengths and ethical chal-
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as possible we tty to control our placement and
work in these groups. Important to note here is
the role of what we might consider secondary
groupings such as clubs or athletic organizations
of one type of another. Actually there may be
very strong bonds here as evidenced in the fierce
arguments that all too frequently break out
between sports fans of differing persuasions.
Something deeply important to our surviving
and thriving seems to be involved. Is it mere
coincidence that we name so many of our sports
teams after rather fierce animals?
Two kinds of social groupings are directly
related to our expectation of genetic reproductive continuance. Our selection of a sexual or
marriage partner initiates not only a bonding of
one individual to another but the prospect of
support or problems from a large number of kin.
Most of these situations provide as much challenge as consolation, but the opportunities must
be made the best of in order to insure thriving.
Parental manipulation of children presents in
intense miniature the same set of problems.
Psychoanalytic literature thrives on the conscious
and unconscious problems presented by the possibilities here for good and ill. While these questions are clearly heightened in the human
situation, because of the greater interplay
between conscious and unconscious factors,
valuable clues can be obtained from the study of
animal kin and familial relationships. Especially
important for our bifurcated American society
would be the role of extended family groupings.
Animal groupings display a good deal of
reciprocity. Not only within a single species but
clearly between and among species there is a symbiotic working relationship to enhance surviving
and thriving. Involved here is a sort of sociobiological Golden Rule, but the soft-core altruism of
the rule is rather strongly at work. It is strongly to
the advantage of one group or species to work
constructively with another. The working relationship is often tenuous and tense, but the balances are maintained more than not. Patterns of
human aggression and defense strongly parallel
these animal configurations. Here the chances
are very high that we have a good deal to learn
from animals in that they seem to have worked
out far better means of accommodation among

but have led to the debilitation or even
extinction of animal species. Humans have at
least the theoretical possibility of reversing this
kind of trend.
The predictive modality works off the central
theorem of sociobiology. Because all conscious,
surface, phenotypical social behavior has its
origin and regulation in unconscious, depth,
genotypical singular mechanisms, humans and
animals will act to maximize their inclusive
fitness. Any biologically, genetically programmed
individual will act so as to propagate and
promote in the best possible way the best interest
of the proximate groupings within the species.
This is the only way in which the individual can
best survive and thrive.
There seems to be a considerable amount of
selfishness involved in such an approach, since
the basic sociobiological mechanisms seem to
center around personal survival at any price.
This is really not so, since the practice of altruism
is essential to this survival. It is impossible for an
individual to survive unless the group survives, so
there must be a contribution to the group in the
hope and expectation of individual profit.
Wilson terms this "soft-core altruism," since while
there actually is concern for others, this concern
is ultimately because of the advantages to self of
such concern.
Ethical questions here abound. While we
might predicate this kind of selfish altruism of
animal behavior, since we do not experience
them as being unrestrictively kind and charitable, we wince at the consideration of human
behavior as being fundamentally selfish. But
moral and economic theories from Adam Smith
to Ayn Rand point out that the pursuit of an
enlightened self-interest is the best way to bring
about the social good. What really is so wrong
about being rewarded for good deeds? If we get
no satisfaction we may not be acting ethically correctly. Human assimilation of animal traits may
be of help.
Altruistic behavior is displayed in four types of
social involvement. 2 Humans and animals tend to
join or become associated with groups which will
insure their best productivity. Sometimes accidents of race, geography, health and age place
individuals into certain groupings. Yet, as much
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In his project of reformulating the tasks of linguistic study Saussure makes two key distinctions.
Language or langue is distinguished from parole
or word.' Langue is the study of the basic structures of language. It is not so bound by the
changes and transformations that languages
experience over a period of time. This distinction is used as a foundation for the patterns
of mythic structure in the work of Levi-Strauss. At
a more surface or conscious level the workings of
myth look more like parole, in that they seem to
be ever changing and filled with complexities. At
a more depth or unconscious level, however, the
structures are more like langue, in that they
remain constant over time and vary little or not
at all from culture to culture.
One of the most important of all elements of
myth is certainly the use of animal figures. Myths
of various cultures, from various times all over the
world, have their sly foxes, wise owls, strong
jaguars, wicked wolves and on and on. It is most
important to note that the animals in the myths
take on human characteristics and the humans
animal characteristics. Certainly one of the things
which is most strongly being suggested in such a
move is the close interrelationship of the two
groups in terms of behaviors. The myths are also
deeply concerned with forms of ethical behavior.
Perhaps what is happening is that one piece or
aspect of human ethical behavior, such as sly and
crafty behavior, is imposed on the more generalized behavior patterns of an animal such as a
fox. A piece of mythic parole is fitted into the
larger langue pattern of behavior. The more
unconscious aspects of animal fox-like behavior
are assimilated to human behavior via the mechanism of a single behavior trait's transference.
I should like to suggest that these single transferences across human and animal lines allow us
to take on in an almost unconscious way a variety
of animal traits. By and large we tell ourselves in
these stoties that we would like to be like the
animals we portray. There is a deep unconscious
affinity which we would like to bring to the
surface. So the study of myth will reveal to us a
large number of situations of ethical similarity
between human and animal behavior.
A second distinction made by Saussure is
between signification or signified and signal or

themselves than we have. There are few, if any,
documented examples of animal genocide. We
unconsciously long for peace and cooperation
while consciously preparing for defensive and
aggressive war. A more in-depth attunement to
our animalistic survival tendencies might be
some of the healthiest actions we can take to preserve ourselves and our planet.
Some of the most creative and suggestive study
done on the assimilation of animal to human
traits is in the massive work of the French structuralist anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss. In
order to understand this method of structuralism
we need to consider the work of the pioneer linguist Ferdinand de Saussure on which much of
Levi-Strauss' structuralism is built. A great deal of
any structuralist approach is based on linguistic
considerations. Since language is basically a set
of communication techniques, the similarities
between human and animal communication can
provide a linking clue into common ethical patterns and behavior.
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symbol <x> works with <a> on one side of the
equation, with <b> on the other. The symbol <y> is
associated with <b> on one side, <a-I> on the
other. Also the equation is structured in a chiasmic
form, so that it could be written out in an X shape;
the <b> factors and the <a> <a-I> factors would
exchange places on either side of the equation.
Let us say that <a> and <b> are human traits
and <x> and <y> are animal traits. We would have
a mechanism for explaining the move from one
set of traits to another. Let us even suppose that
one side of the equation is more conscious, the
other more unconscious. Then the possibilities
of substitution are rich and complex indeed. But
it is important to note that at least one of the
factors <a-I> is the opposite of another factor
<a>. This is because in any mythic transformation
there is a residual element which can never be
wholly and precisely explicated. In the transformations involved in the mythic study of human
and animal behavior there has to be an ultimately inexplicable factor recalcitrant to full and
clear explication. There are deep and rich similarities between human and animal behavior, but
they must be studied and explored in the mystic
interplay between deeply felt experiences rooted
and grounded in the collective unconscious of
both animality and humanity.
A rich and fruitful study of the unconsciously
mythic character of human and animal experience can be done by working through the
richness of the Jungian enterprise, and a large
number of the somewhat disparate elements in,
for instance, Symbols of Transformation could be
fitted onto the Levi-Straussian chiasmatic
scheme. Nonetheless, for the purposes of
continuity in the Saussurian linguistic vein it
might be useful to consider at least briefly the
Freudian approach ofJacques Lacan.
Any such approach will be much involved in
the kind of parental manipulations modality of
the practice of altruism already discussed in the
material on sociobiology. Especially in the mechanisms of the Oedipus cycle we encounter the
inability to clearly articulate our relationship to
the closest of our social groupings, the family.
Father figures play large roles here, in that they
force a move into an order of clarity which is
much resisted by the very structure of our uncon-

signifier" Together these constitute the linguistic
sign. Unreflectively we think that a word directly
and precisely denotes an object, but a little
reflection will quickly show that this is not the
case. If the word, tree, for instance denoted
directly a tree which I might see in front of me,
then I could not use this word to denote any
other tree I might see. Rather, the sound (signal)
which I make when I say tree refers to a concept
(signification). When signal-sound and conceptsignification are working properly together, then
proper reference of the word, tree, to the object
can be made. But I can just as well use another
sound-word, such as arbor or baum, to designate
the same object.
This shows that any single word-sign is really
part of a larger langue situation. There is a great
deal of unconscious linguistic activity going on in
the production of any linguistic sign, thus
making any such sign ultimately arbitrary. But
this arbitrariness is in the context of the rich
connotations that each term picks up in the
history of the development and use of the language. When we move from one sign to another,
even within the same language, we carry a
hidden residual piece of linguistic baggage which
provides the foundation for the constant changes
in language and vocabulary. Because there is so
much unconscious linguistic slippage, we move
and develop different patterns of language.
The same thing occurs in mythic situations,
where one or another element is assimilated to a
different mythic factor via a process of rather
unconscious manipulation and substitution. LeviStrauss has a rich and complex formula to
explicate this kind of substitution. 5 It is a most
important formula because so much mythic substitution has to do with the exchange of human
and animal characteristics. It reads as follows:
Fx(a) : Fy(b) .::: Fx(b) : Fa-l (y)

The symbol in the middle of the equation is an
equivalence notation. The symbol <a-I> is the
opposite to the symbol <a>. The capital F is just a
function notation which will allow the interplay of
the symbols <a> <a-I> and <b>, <x> and <y>. We
can see that there is a rich substitutionary interplay
among the various parts of the equation. The
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scious. Lacan reads Freud in a very linguistic way;
he thinks that the analysis of the language of his
patients was the basic and only primary operation on which Freud concentrated the force of
his psychoanalytic technique. Lacan builds a
Saussurian component into the process. The
crisis in the Oedipal cycle has to do with the
correct connections to be made between signalsignifIers and signified-signifIcations. This is
expressed in a central formula: 6

When we come to' try to recognize ethical similarities between ourselves and animals, we have to
realize that in some sense they also experience
this kind of crisis of social and ethical identity.
Almost all animal groupings as a result manifest
rather rigidly hierarchical patterns of familial and
social structure. Any interaction which we have
with animals must take these structures into
account. Careful attempts must be made to integrate these structures into the kinds and patterns
of structures to which we humans are accustomed.
The difficulty is that our human patterns are
governed in great part by the free play of our
unconscious. We cannot be totally secure about
our human social and ethical structures. The
greatest promise and the greatest challenge of
ethics resides in the opportunities and pitfalls of
social interaction. Human ethical behavior in
this context remains unpredictable and not
subject to a neat scientific study or explanation.
Rather, it operates more like a narrative or language in which we have to go with the flow of
events and affairs in order to reach some degree
of fulfillmen t and satisfaction.
We also perceive that animal behavior seems
to be more or less socially successful and ethically
appropriate. Anyone who lives with a dog knows
that there are displays of accomplishment and
displays of guilt. These behavior patterns are
much involved with the proper or improper integration of animal behavior patterns into human
behavior patterns. This occurs all through the
preliminary oral and anal stages of proper
feeding and housebreaking to the crucial
parental-type Oedipal patterns of integration
into the family unit.
At both the human and the animal level these
patterns are never completely controlled or
understood. Rather, there is a perilous and gratifying interaction with considerable room for surprise developments. It is the element of lack of
predictability and control which furnishes the
very stuff of ethics. Because of the unconscious
mechanisms of unpredictability which underlie
both human and animal behavior, we can never
be sure what may occur in the interactions
among ourselves, we develop social and ethical
codes to have some order and structure in our
relationships. Ethical behavior in both humans

S'
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S

Another way of stating the same formula
which puts it in more chiasmatic form is as
follows:
S'
S'

S

s

s

S

x
S

S

In both versions of these formulae the capital
S stands for the signal-signifiers and the small s
for the signified-signifIcations. It is quite clear
that the majority of the emphasis is on the latter.
The reason for this is that Lacan holds that the
unconscious is structured like a language, but it
is a Saussurian language in which the emphasis is
on the free play of linguistic signals. Our experience of language is conditioned by the free play
of the unconscious, as this is dramatically condensed in the workings of the Oedipus complex.
The actual points of precise clarity in our understanding of our place in the family configuration
and the ability to thus neatly play out our
assigned roles are few and far apart. Our early
familiar experience grounds the attempts we
make throughout our life to achieve clarity. This
familial experience forms the foundation for any
social groupings into which we enter during the
rest of our lives. Ethics never occurs outside the
context of a social group. The instabilities and
unpredictabilities of social groups form the questions and challenges pointing to proper or
improper ethical behavior.
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the mannerisms derived from them. You have to
play along with them.
There is again a specifically linguistic way of
understanding this dynamic. One of the most
influential linguistic theorists of the first part of
this century is Ludwig Wittgenstein. In his early
work Wittgenstein stressed very much the logical
precision of language. But he encountered
severe difficulties in trying to understand how
such a rigid language could refer to or picture
reality. The work of his later period conceived
language rather as a set of games.' Here there are
rules but they are malleable. Even more importantly, the basic thing about a game is not so
much the understanding of the rules but the
playing of the game.
Ethics is not so much understood by study as
by practice. It is rather like being proficient in a
game or sport. Animals seem to display to a great
extent these playful characteristics. One of the
reasons that animal wildlife presentations remain
so popular on television is that a good deal of the
behavior seems plainly playful fun. Yet, even the
play of young offspring is play with a purpose,
the learning of personal skills for survival and
growth which will ensure the thriving of individual and species group. The colorfully playful
courtship displays so often cinematographically
recorded for our entertainment have a pointed
pragmatic purpose.
Ethics itself remains pragmatically playful.
Different approaches and solutions must be tried
out in a variety of contexts and circumstances to
attempt success. Like a game ethics is also never
really finished. The excitement and fun is in the
playing of the game, not in the conclusion.
Hence, both human and animal ethical behavior
are incomplete and unfinished.
It seems not coincidental that a renewed
interest in animal behavior and ethics is
occurring when, at least in the areas of the social
sciences, there is a re-examination of basic
methodologies. This is sometimes termed a postmodern approach. Jean Francois Lyotard, in his
work on the postmodern condition, cites some differences between the older scientific approach
and current trends in the sociology ofknowledge.8
First, in its older mode scientific language makes
denotation central. There must be an attempt

thics is not so much
understood by study as by

practice. It is rather like being
proficient in a game or sport..... One
of the reasons that animal wildlife
presentations remain so popular on
television is that a good deal of the
behavior seems plainly playful fun.
Yet, even the play of young offspring
is play with a purpose! the learning of
personal skills for survival and growth
which will ensure the thriving of
individual and species group.

and animals is always a risky and chancy affair.
This is why we never can discover or enforce any
fmal and complete ethic which will be accepted
and agreed upon by all. Rather, there is usually a
very cautious approach to any ethical conclusion
or consensus. Ethical behavior must remain an
area of excitement and adventure. Since we find
human ethics so problematic, puzzling,
promising, and satisfying, we feel a need to want
to explore the same areas in animal behavior.
Our common and shared experiences should
provide clues to greater clarity but will
undoubtedly also lead into ever more mystery.
We find ourselves in ethical matters playing
more of a game than working out precise scientific answers. A good deal of our relationship
with animals carries a great deal of this gameslike atmosphere. It is certainly true of our
dealings with pets, but is also the case in working
with such domesticated animals as farm animals.
It is vital to know their own needs and drives and
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made to delimit and delineate as precisely as possible the exact parameters of the matter under
study. A postmodern approach (sometimes called
a deconstructive approach) would be more interested in the narrative interactions between conceptual and linguistic frames and the area of
investigation or study. Rather than attempting to
clearly define the ethical parameters of human
and animal behavior, it is much more important
to playfully, commonly explore the possibilities of
interaction. This awakened realization of the
wealth of shared human and animal possibilities
probably underlies a good deal of the rising
concern over what is perceived now to be an
unethical use of animals in research projects. Such
crass research settings for human and animal
interaction force us back to viewing animals more
as scientific objects of study than partners in a
common social and ethical search.
Second, in a context of hard scientific research
there is a stress only on the role of the researcher.
The subject is relegated to the status of being a
mere object of investigation. Our social and
ethical behavior is too closely related to that of
animals to allow for such a separation. We are
much more involved with the life and destiny of
animals, and they with us, to allow either of us to
objectify each other. While there is little evidence
that animals so treat us as objects, in the rather
few instances where we interpret their behavior as
so motivated, we tend to hold them ethically
responsible. The man-eating lion is somehow
guilty. It is interesting to note that guilt is surmised
in this situation because there is an unwarranted
in trusion of the patterns of animal social behavior
into the patterns of human social behavior. It is
interesting to note that we might well consider the
lion guilty but are, at least until recently, less concerned to consider the hunter guilty when the
death of the prey severely disrupted the patternings of lion social structure.
Third, science as we have known it, claims to
discover and establish truth once and for all.
There is a stress on the role and function of rather
absolute theorems and principles. Knowledge of
the workings of these factors will provide a key to
the absolute and unchanging patterns of reality.
But advances in all areas of science, from physics
to physiology and psychology, show that the real-
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ities studied are in constant process of change
and development. Our theories must playfully
mimic these processes. This also means that our
theories and studies must have a past, present, and
future. We have to be attuned to the personal and
collective memories of ourselves and our species.
We must also have some sort of project in mind
for the future.
In questions of human and animal behavior
there is both the history of the respective
groupings in each category as well as (at least
from the human side) the present sense of need
for a better rapport in the future. A basic start has
been made by the very recognition that there are
profound similarities between human and animal
social behavior. This recognition immediately
carries with it an ethical imperative that all social
groupings manifest the playful possibilities and
pitfalls which are the very stuff of ethical inquiry
and striving. The more we recognize the ethical
similarities between human and animal behavior,
the more we will be able to foster and facilitate
the playful gaming which has been going on
between us from the earliest aeons of evolution.
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